








From Words to Deeds: Upholding the Rule of 
Law in the CEE Region 
 




All three European institutions kicked off this 
legislative year with the rule of law at the top of 
their agendas. Speaking in the European 
Parliament hemicycle on 8 July, Chancellor 
Merkel put the rule of law on the German 
Presidency's list of priorities. Speaking on the 
same day in Karlsruhe, Commissioner Věra 
Jourová warned it "should be a precondition for 
the distribution of EU money." 1 Yet, the murky 
affair of EU conditionally on the rule of law 
continues after the summer recess. The July 
European Council meeting conclusions 
generated considerable commentary over the 
summer, pitting the Parliament against the 
Council. In a joint letter dated from 26 August, 
leaders of the main political groups in the 
Parliament warned of an institutional blockage on 
the MFF without strong guarantees on the rule of 
law and EU values. 
These declarations follow a further side-lining of 
liberal democracy in Central and Eastern Europe 
(CEE) amid the COVID-19 pandemic. In 
Hungary, an emergency law adopted on 30 March 
allowed Prime Minister Viktor Orbán to rule by 
decree indefinitely. In Poland, the Law and 
Justice Party introduced hasty legislation playing 
fast and loose with the constitution and the 
fairness of Presidential elections. This 
backtracking in Budapest and Warsaw as the 
health situation evolved was compounded by 
further restrictions to press freedom in Hungary 
With ongoing discussions on rule of law 
conditionality, and with the European 
Commission first Annual Rule of Law 
Report due soon, the focus on the rule of 
law is back at the top of the EU political 
agenda this autumn. As eyes turn to the 
latest political developments and threats 
to core EU principles and values in 
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), this 
policy brief suggests switching from a 
top-to-top perspective to a societal 
approach to uphold the rule of law. This 
would go beyond recommendations to 
cleanse the rule of law toolbox from 
inefficient political instruments, and 
strengthen legal ones. In addition to 
introducing conditionality, this brief 
advocates for more active support of local 
civil societies in exercising their 
democratic prerogatives over electoral 








and ideologically motivated repression of LGBT 
activism in Poland. These actions during the 
summer recess add to worrying trends.  
In the CEE region, challenges to liberal 
democracy have been jeopardising the legal and 
normative grounds upon which European 
integration is built. The European Commission, 
as guardian of the treaties, has the legal basis to 
act when a Member State undermines the rule of 
law. Similarly, Member States, as contracting 
parties to EU treaties, have a shared responsibility 
to keep each-others in check and lead by example. 
However, acting to uphold the rule of law in the 
EU in recent years has amounted to stirring up a 
hornets' nest, with two significant difficulties to 
overcome. The first is of a legal and procedural 
nature: EU institutions lack effective means of 
action. The second is of a political and normative 
nature: they lack the democratic legitimacy 
bestowed by elections to act in national politics. 
As a result, previous attempts to uphold the rule 
of law in Poland and Hungary invariably have led 
to a political impasse and criticisms of partiality 
and anti-democratic meddling. How then to 
move from words to deeds? 
Breaches to the rule of law in Poland and 
Hungary are amongst the most significant of the 
challenges posed to European integration. 
Consequently, this European Policy Brief starts 
with the challenges posed by an ‘illiberal’ form of 
democratic governance in former communist 
states. This brief advocates for comprehensive 
solutions to strengthen existing instruments, 
develop new ones, and renounce counter-
productive measures. After a period of dormancy 
and amid current societal polarisation in Europe, 
this brief points to the increasing mobilisation of 
liberal forces in CEE in European post-
communist civil societies. This (re)mobilisation 
should be encouraged by using all tools available 
to the EU and its Member States. 
 
THE CHALLENGE OF SOCIETAL 
POLARISATION IN THE CEE   
January 2019 marked the 15th anniversary of 
CEE countries' membership to the EU. This was 
a bittersweet anniversary as a "counter-revolution 
by law" follows much of CEE’s transition to 
liberal democracy and Europeanisation 
successes.2  In Hungary, the 2008 financial and 
economic crises fostered an ideological shift, 
whereby liberalism has replaced communism as 
the perceived primary threat to the nation. This 
idea had long been incubating in Poland too, but 
has escalated with the victory of the Law and 
Justice Party in 2015. This ideological shift was 
for the most part already foreseen by CEE 
specialists and is rooted in a broader post-
communist political and intellectual context.3 
While societal polarisation is by no means limited 
to the CEE, the context of post-communist 
transformations is often cast aside in discussions 
surrounding the rule of law in the EU. Initial 
democratisation successes in CEE countries 
largely glossed over the social costs of liberal 
economic reforms and on-going corruption 
struggles. From the mid-2000s, disappointment 
with liberal elites coupled with cultural 
disorientation has generated a delayed fatigue in 
the liberal democratic model4 and accelerated the 
development of neo-traditional subcultural 
trends.5 In Hungary, Poland, and to a lesser 
extent Romania and Slovakia, this has led to an 
authoritarian turn which has jeopardised the 
separation of powers, freedom of press, 
protection of minorities and neutrality of the civil 
service. 
A few years ago, only a few could have foreseen 
Article 7 procedures against Poland and Hungary. 
Today, backsliding on liberal democracy has 
grown to constitute one of the greatest challenges 
to the legitimacy of the EU. This challenge is 
twofold. Behind the rule of law principle is a 








between Member States in a multi-level 
governance system. Hence, it is the responsibility 
of all Member States to keep their co-signatories 
accountable. Enshrined in the Preamble to the 
Laeken Declaration and in Article 2 TEU, the 
rule of law has become the normative 
cornerstone of the integration process. Thus, the 
responsibility for upholding the rule of law falls 
not only on Member States but also on the 
Commission and Parliament. Failure to uphold 
the rule of law in recent years has jeopardised 
cooperation and consensus-building between 
national governments. It also weakened the EU 
normative appeal, especially in its Eastern 
neighbourhood. This is rightly causing alarm 
among both observers of, and actors in, 
European affairs. 
WHICH INSTRUMENTS TO UPHOLD THE 
RULE OF LAW? 
In July 2019, the Juncker Commission released its 
blueprint for action to strengthen the rule of law 
within the Union. 6 This came more than two years 
after the European Parliament passed a resolution 
calling for the establishment of an EU mechanism 
on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental 
rights (so-called DRF pact).7 Last December, the 
von der Leyen Commission committed to advancing 
this work by strengthening the toolbox of 
instruments. This also aimed to develop a more 
systematic approach to bringing anti-infringement 
cases to the European Court of Justice and to create 
a proposal for introducing rule of law conditionality 
to EU funding. 
Cleansing the rule of law toolbox – The EU is not 
defenceless to attacks on the rule of law in its 
Member States. Instead, the EU toolbox is 
fragmented into a multitude of instruments. They 
include the Rule of Law Framework, the EU Justice 
Scoreboard, the European Semester, the Council 
Annual Rule of Law Dialogue, the Cooperation and 
Verification Mechanism, Infringement Actions 
(Articles 258 and 259 TFEU), Interim Measures 
(Article 279 TFEU), Article 7 TEU and the work of 
agencies (inter alia the Fundamental Rights Agency, 
the European Anti-Fraud Office and the soon to be 
operative European Public Prosecutor's Office). In 
recent years, some of these instruments have proven 
effective, yet could be used more systematically. 
Other instruments have untapped potential, while a 
few are mostly smokescreens. This leaves room for 
improvement. 
First, the first Annual Monitoring Report on rule of 
law performance in all Member States is to be 
published this month and is a welcomed 
development. It should hopefully cut short criticisms 
of partiality and anti-democratic meddling, while 
expanding the Commission’s expertise. Designed to 
be more ‘comprehensive’ than the European 
Semester process, it remains to be seen whether it 
successfully reaches out to a plurality of stakeholders. 
Second, clarifications on the role of EU agencies, EU 
institutions and Council of Europe bodies could 
facilitate procedures and ease the co-existence of two 
fundamental human rights frameworks and case 
laws on the rule of law in Europe. Lengthy 
procedures, a multitude of actors, and dense legal 
jargon make it arduous for relevant stakeholders to 
follow ‘who does what’ and ‘what is going on’ in the 
rule of law framework. 
Third, the Council's Annual Rule of Law Dialogue 
has so far demonstrated few results. In the absence 
of explicit political engagement from the Member 
States, a transparent peer-review system would be 
more constructive in defusing rule of law conflicts 
before they escalate and become entrenched regional 
positions blocking EU-decision making. 
Strengthening legal instruments – The European Court of 
Justice (CJEU) rulings spelt out the substantive 
dimension of Article 2 TEU which now imposes 
clear legal obligations on Member States. This 
includes effective judicial protection by independent 
and impartial courts, equality before the law, and 
effective judicial review, all enforceable by the CJEU 








procedures launched by the Commission against 
Poland and Hungary have met some success, 
notably in safeguarding some independence for the 
Polish Supreme Court. What was achieved in the 
European Commission v. Republic of Poland (Case 
C-619/19) should serve as an example to follow. 
A strategic approach to bringing anti-infringement 
cases to the CJEU can ensure stronger enforceability 
of the toolbox. Yet more efforts are required to 
reduce the period of dialogue, and launch more 
systemic and accelerated infringement procedures. 
This would give further leverage-power to the new 
enhanced European Rule of Law Mechanism. The 
stigma of a CJEU ruling against a Member State in a 
rule of law infringement can act as a powerful 
disincentive. 
Introducing conditionality, between coercion and incentives – 
The proposal for a new budgetary conditionality 
mechanism linking EU funds to the respect of the 
rule of law regained prominence amid discussions on 
the next MFF, also linked to Next Generation EU, 
and the latest misdemeanours in the CEE. It is an 
opportunity to seize. It is evident that this can have a 
significant impact on those Member States which 
rely heavily on EU funding, and that monitoring and 
legal proceedings alone cannot suffice. 
In another Egmont policy brief, Alexander Mattelaer 
(ed.) outlined the risks of political coercion-based 
forms of conditionality. The logic of sanctioning 
some policy behaviours comes with collateral 
damage for EU cohesion, EU publicity in the 
Member States, and the voluntary spirit of the 
integration process. Article 7 TEU procedures in 
relation to Poland and Hungary make good 
examples. They have so far brought few results and 
instead added to societal polarisation and the 
radicalisation of governmental positions, which have 
subsequently spilled over to other policy areas of the 
Council’s activity. 9 
As of today, political blockage at the EU level poses 
a greater threat than political backlash. The gridlock 
of Article 7(2), which calls for the Council to act 
based on unanimity minus the Member State under 
examination, is to continue unless reverse qualified 
majority is agreed upon. This is rendered complex by 
discussions on rule of law conditionality, now 
indexed to MFF negotiations, for which unanimity 
in the Council and consent of the Parliament are 
required. Divergent reactions from national 
governments, Commissioners and MEPs following 
the July EUCO conclusions have only increased 
confusion. 10 Ultimately, conditionally on the rule of 
law seems inevitable. Yet, it is dependent on the 
German Presidency’ success in depoliticising the 
debate.  
What is clear is that there is little use for an enhanced 
Rule of Law Mechanism without some form of 
conditionality to provide it with political leverage. 
Nevertheless, there is little doubt that, in the longer-
term, betting on the carrot rather than the stick 
would prove more successful in grounding the rule 
of law in CEE. Political and economic incentives 
rewarding transparent and accountable management 
of EU funds alongside positive track records in 
fighting corruption could be a more encouraging 
form of conditionality. Inspiration can be drawn 
from the many EU financing instruments dedicated 
to the external promotion of the rule of law and EU 
values. Overall, this points to the need for a more 
comprehensive and societal approach to ensure the 
rule of law principle and safeguard EU values. 
TOWARDS A MORE SOCIETAL APPROACH  
TO THE RULE OF LAW  
The Commission’s July blueprint, with its focus on 
promoting a "rule of law culture", makes a timid first 
step in that direction. On paper, a societal approach 
to upholding the rule of law in the EU meets the 
requirement of a uniform standard for judicial 
independence and defence of EU values across the 
EU. This would increase the likelihood of curbing 
criticisms of discrimination and accusations of a lack 
of objectivity. In practice, this will need to be bold 
and do more than symbolic sponsorship and annual 








The Commission’s first annual report on the rule of 
law is expected to be published in September 2020. 
Covering all 27 Member States, this should ideally 
allow the Commission to pre-empt threats to the rule 
of law. This should also equip the Commission with 
the necessary knowledge to fully grasp distinctive 
local and contextual issues in different European 
regions. As mentioned previously, this is of particular 
relevance in the case of CEE Member States. 
The COVID-19 context during which consultations 
with stakeholders were held was not ideal. The health 
crisis only allowed for ‘virtual’ visits from the 
Commission’s legal experts. Additionally, 
extraordinary situations of lockdowns and their 
emergency laws are likely to have kept civil society 
stakeholders focused on COVID-19 context 
violations. Unfortunately, this might weaken the 
legitimacy of the conclusions in the Commission’s 
report making it more difficult to defend rule of law 
conditionality on the basis of this. 
Regardless of this year’s unique context, associating 
stakeholders in a monitoring mechanism cannot 
make up for the lack of civic awareness of legality, 
constitutionality, and rights, which only Member 
States' education systems can easily address. Still, the 
new mechanism can encourage civic engagement if 
transparent and beyond top-to-top exchanges of 
views. While article 7 TEU demonstrated clear 
limitations in Brussels, moving from Article 7(1) to 
7(2) has been successful in politicising issues of non-
compliance with core EU principles and EU values 
at the level of citizens. 
In Poland most notably, this has encouraged the 
organisation and mobilisation of grassroots liberal 
forces. Here, civic energy is mobilising in defense of 
democratic values, women’s rights and LGBT rights, 
after previously being dormant or apolitical in the 
modern context. 11 A similar process is under way 
within Romania' and Bulgarian’s civil societies. The 
close results from the 2020 Polish presidential 
elections, which turned into a referendum in favour 
or against the neo-traditional model of society 
developed by Jarosław Kaczyński, proved that liberal 
values are still widespread and well-grounded in 
CEE societies. Growing kaleidoscope of civic 
engagement in the region, with notably the 
mobilisation of younger generations, offer grounds 
for optimism. 
In this regard, inspiration can be drawn from the 
civic society community created around the 
European Citizens' Initiative. Despite shortcomings, 
it has succeeded in creating an active transnational 
community of activists and experts as well as 
growing civic awareness around the ECI. A 
centralised platform with a stakeholders’ forum is an 
initiative to be implemented sooner rather than later 
to help the rule of law become more visible to 
citizens and assist local stakeholders in promoting it. 
All observations, publications, and documents, 
including the Commission’s Annual Report on the 
Rule of Law and formal reports on Article 7 
hearings, should be made public on such platform. 
Finally, strengthening re-energised civil societies in 
their democratic prerogatives also calls for direct 
financial support. In Hungary and Poland, 
governmental supervision and stricter regulations on 
NGOs’ and media funding have opened the door to 
severe risks of ideological biases. It is therefore 
crucial that a regime of rule of law conditionality does 
not simply cut off all transfers of EU funds, but 
rather bypasses national governments to channel 
funds directly to their final recipients. Ultimately, it 
rests on civil societies to keep these values alive, on 
European Institutions to help them do so beyond 
words and on all Member States to lead by example. 
One of the characteristics of EU approaches to 
upholding the rule of law has been its focus on 
political and legal top-down instruments. This brief 
suggests cleansing the rule of law toolbox from 
inefficient political instruments, strengthening legal 
instruments, and introducing conditionality. This 
brief also suggests switching perspective to put more 
trust in local liberal democratic forces. In the current 
context of political remobilisation of civil societies 
and discussions on rule of law conditionality in 








beneficiaries is crucial. Similarly, transnational activist 
networks and full transparency on all rule of law 
matters is necessary for civil societies to keep their 
governments accountable. Finally, launching 
infringement procedures, by the Commission or a 
Member State, should become systematic. Where a 
systematic violation of EU principles and values is 
identified, there is no time to lose. This becomes 
urgent as societal polarisation and disappointment in 
the capitalistic and liberal form of democracy is 
widespread across the EU, and is unlikely to be 
resolved soon, even less so by itself. 
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